A View From Sarawak Malaysia S Costly Concession The 2009 Brunei Deal And The Loss Of Sarawak S Oil Wealth

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I received this today. I dont know who wrote it but it appears to express a Sarawakian view of some things that happened in 2009.
Badawi Is Dead But Never Forget He Gave Away Sarawak's Oil Blocks To Brunei WIthout Sarawak's Permission 
Malaysia’s Costly Concession: The 2009 Brunei Deal and the Loss of Sarawak’s Oil Wealth 
In March 2009, Malaysia, under then-Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, signed a secretive agreement with Brunei that critics argue ranks among the nation’s most egregious diplomatic blunders. 
The Exchange of Letters, as it’s euphemistically called, resolved a decades-long territorial dispute over Limbang and offshore oil blocks in the South China Sea—but at what cost? According to detractors, Malaysia handed Brunei sovereignty over two immensely valuable oil blocks, known as L and M (now Brunei’s CA1 and CA2), in a deal so lopsided it’s tantamount to giving away Sarawak’s economic future for a pittance. 
Assuming the worst-case scenario, the numbers are staggering, and the fallout continues to haunt Malaysia’s credibility and prosperity. The Deal: A Faustian Bargain The 2009 agreement was sold as a diplomatic triumph, ostensibly securing Limbang—a Sarawak district Brunei historically claimed—while granting Malaysia a 40-year commercial stake in the disputed oil blocks. 
But critics, led by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, cried foul, accusing Badawi of surrendering Malaysia’s sovereign rights over blocks L and M, which they claim held reserves worth hundreds of billions. The lack of transparency fueled suspicion: the letters’ details were never fully disclosed, and the public learned of the deal’s scope only when Murphy Oil, a U.S. firm with contracts for the blocks, announced their termination in 2010, stating the areas were “no longer part of Malaysia.” 
Why the secrecy? Critics argue Badawi’s administration knew the deal was indefensible. By ceding sovereignty, Malaysia relinquished control over resources that could have transformed Sarawak and the nation. The joint development arrangement with P------s, Malaysia’s state oil firm, was a weak consolation—Brunei now calls the shots, and Malaysia’s share is a fraction of what full ownership would have yielded. 
Limbang, a small district with limited economic potential, was hardly worth the trade. Some even question whether Brunei explicitly dropped its claim, as Brunei’s Foreign Minister later suggested Limbang wasn’t discussed, casting doubt on Malaysia’s supposed gains. 
The Staggering Value Lost 
Let’s assume the worst, as critics have long feared: blocks L and M were a treasure trove of oil and gas, and Malaysia’s concession was a catastrophic miscalculation. In 2010, analysts speculated block L alone could produce 150,000–200,000 barrels per day (bpd), potentially doubling Brunei’s output at the time. Combined with block M, estimates suggested reserves of 500 million to 1 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BOE), possibly more, given nearby fields like Kikeh, which boasted 400–700 million barrels. 
Fast-forward to 2025, with Brent crude hovering at $80–$90 per barrel, the gross value of 1 billion BOE could exceed $80–90 billion. Gas, a significant component, adds further billions at $5–$7 per million Btu. 
Since 2009, Brunei has quietly developed these blocks with partners like Total and Shell. Assuming production began around 2013–2015 and ramped up to 50,000–100,000 bpd by 2025 (a conservative worst-case estimate), the blocks may have already yielded 200–400 million BOE. At $80 per barrel, that’s $16–$32 billion in gross revenue—revenue Malaysia could have claimed outright. 
Instead, P------s scrambles for a minority share, perhaps 20–30%, leaving Malaysia with crumbs: maybe $3–$9 billion over a decade, minus hefty costs and taxes. Over the 40-year agreement, critics warn, Malaysia’s total take might not exceed $20–$30 billion, while Brunei reaps $50–$100 billion or more. 
Mahathir’s claim of a RM320 billion (USD100 billion) loss, once dismissed as hyperbole, looks chillingly plausible in this light. 
Production: Brunei’s Gain, Malaysia’s Pain 
Brunei’s reticence about CA1 and CA2’s output only deepens suspicions. Unlike Malaysia, which publishes P------s reports, Brunei releases vague national figures. In 2022, Brunei’s oil and gas exports were $2.1 billion, with CA1 and CA2 likely contributing significantly since exploration resumed post-2009. If each block produces 25,000–50,000 bpd (a reasonable worst-case guess), that’s 18–36 million barrels annually combined. 
Over 10 years, 180–360 million barrels at $80 yields $14–$29 billion already pocketed by Brunei and its partners. Malaysia’s cut, filtered through P------s’ diluted stake, might be $2–$8 billion—peanuts compared to full ownership. Gas adds insult to injury. CA1’s Maharaja Lela field, for instance, is rumored to be gas-heavy, feeding Brunei’s LNG exports (90 cargoes daily). If CA1/CA2 supply 20–30% of Brunei’s gas, that’s billions more in revenue Malaysia could have tapped. 
Instead, P------s plays second fiddle, its profits siphoned off by Brunei’s sovereignty and foreign operators like Total. Critics argue this is a slow bleed: every barrel and cubic foot extracted enriches Brunei while Malaysia watches from the sidelines, locked into a deal that prioritizes diplomacy over dollars. 
Why It Hurts: Sarawak’s Betrayal For Sarawakians, the deal stings deepest. Blocks L and M lie off their coast, yet Sarawak sees little benefit. Malaysia’s federal structure funnels oil revenue to Putrajaya and P------s, not the state. Had Malaysia retained sovereignty, Sarawak could have pushed for a bigger share, boosting local development. Instead, the 2009 deal feels like a double betrayal: Kuala Lumpur gave away Sarawak’s wealth, and Sarawakians got no say. 
Critics point to Badawi’s haste—signed weeks before his resignation—as evidence of political expediency, perhaps to burnish his legacy or placate Brunei at Malaysia’s expense. 
The Limbang argument falls flat. Valued at $1–$2 billion in land and resources, it’s a drop in the bucket compared to the blocks’ potential. Even if Brunei’s claim was weak (historical records suggest it was), Malaysia could have negotiated harder or pursued arbitration, as it did successfully against Indonesia over Sipadan and Ligitan in 2002. 
Instead, Badawi’s team folded, leaving critics to speculate about incompetence—or worse, hidden motives. 
Was pressure from foreign oil firms or geopolitical players a factor? The secrecy invites such questions, unanswered to this day. 
A Legacy of Regret. Assuming the worst, the 2009 deal is a wound that festers. Brunei, a tiny sultanate, gained a windfall that could sustain its economy for decades, while Malaysia forfeited a resource base that could have funded schools, hospitals, and infrastructure. 
P------s’ commercial stake is a bandage on a gaping hole—Malaysia trades sovereignty for scraps, reliant on Brunei’s goodwill and foreign operators’ terms. By 2049, when the 40-year deal expires, the blocks may be depleted, leaving Malaysia with nothing but regret. Critics like Mahathir were right to sound the alarm: the deal was a giveaway, cloaked in diplomatic platitudes. The lack of public debate, the rushed timing, and the murky terms scream mismanagement. 
Sarawakians, especially, deserve answers—why was their birthright bartered so cheaply? As Brunei drills and prospers, Malaysia counts the cost of a decision that, in the worst light, traded a fortune for fleeting goodwill. The numbers don’t lie: up to $100 billion lost, and counting. For a nation that prides itself on sovereignty, this was a surrender history won’t forgive.
My Comments :  
So the Limbang claim was never discussed or resolved. But how can the Limbang "claim" be even part of the equation? Limbang is inside Sarawak. Limbang is part of Sarawak. Ok so Brunei has claimed Limbang but that is just a claim. Physical possession of Limbang is already with Sarawak. So they gave up Blocks L and M in "exchange" for Brunei dropping their claim over territory that is already in the possession of Malaysia?
You bargained for something that is already in your possession !!

And now the Brunei people have said they never even discussed Limbang in 2009. If Limbang was not discussed in 2009 then what was the consideration for surrendering Blocks L and M to Brunei?
And why just a few weeks before the prime minister was stepping down? And why so secretive? This is conceding sovereign territory. Why was surrender of Malaysian territory not discussed in Parliament? Or discussed at the Sarawak State Legislature?There was absolutely no ruling by any International Court.There was absolutely no ruling by any international arbitration.Like for Sipadan or Pulau Batu Putih.  They just handed over Malaysian sovereign territory.What was the consideration?Someone must have got something.Satisfaction perhaps.Or something else.
And why in 2009? Malaysia was formed in 1963. Blocks L and M (that piece of the sea) must have come with the 1963 Malaysia Agreement. That was 46 years already. In 46 years there were no rulings by any International Court or international arbitration. So why suddenly in 2009 a soon to exit prime minister just handed over that territory to someone else?
Its like those durian trees. Yes they were planted on State land. But they were planted 40 years ago or longer than that. Nobody paid any attention over 40 years that over 14,000 acres of State land were being planted with durian trees?
What about Cameron Highlands today? Are all those vegetable farms in Cameron Highlands operating on their own lands? How many thousand acres of vegetable farms are operating "illegally" on State land? If you chase out all those illegal vegetable farms wont it affect the supply of vegetables in the country?  
So why in 2009?

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.
By Syed Akbar Ali 

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