Malaysia S First Federal Level Csa 8 Questions To Answer

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Finally, Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob's administration and the official opposition (i.e. Pakatan Harapan) will be signing a memorandum of understanding for transformation and political stability (MOU-TPS).
This followed after months of negotiations and effectively, becoming Malaysia's first federal-level confidence and supply agreement (CSA).
While we do not know the final details, which will be unveiled only by 5pm this evening, let us applaud the prime minister and Harapan leaders Anwar Ibrahim, Lim Guan Eng and Mohamad Sabu, all 11 negotiators from both sides as well as others who have contributed to the process in earlier negotiations.
Here are some questions that may need to be answered and some details that deserve attention to make this CSA work.
Is this a CSA?
A CSA is a political instrument between the government and the opposition. The government makes policy and/or institutional concessions in exchange for the opposition's support or neutrality on votes of confidence, no-confidence, budget, royal speeches, or key bills that are tied to the government's survival.
Whether the MOU-TPS is a CSA can be easily ascertained by checking if the opposition promised to vote for, or at least abstain, on the key votes that can break a government.
While a minority government normally enters a CSA, nothing stops a government with a majority to sign one as a form of political insurance. Even if it covers only budget or confidence but not both, it is still a CSA.
The MOU-TPS does not cease to be a CSA just because it is not called CSA. This is just like Malaysia's movement control order (MCO) is still a lockdown even if it is not called lockdown. Stop splitting hairs.
Does CSA mean a unity government or co-optation of the opposition?
A unity government or a grand coalition means formal power-sharing with the former opposition (or minority parties/bloc) joining the existing government (or the largest party/bloc).
All parties take up offices of ministers and/or deputy ministers and are collectively responsible for the government's policies.
A CSA is an instrument for opposition parties that want to keep the government going but do not want to join it, often because of ideological differences, fear of electoral backlash by its supporters, or avoidance of an early election.
The opposition under a CSA is free to vote against the government's bills and motions without actively causing its collapse.

Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim
While some CSAs, like the last one in New Zealand (2017-2020) between Labour and Greens, may offer certain portfolios for the CSA partners (environmental minister post for Greens), most CSAs would leave the CSA partners entirely out of the government.
CSAs are typically found in countries where minority governments are common, like in Denmark, New Zealand post-1996 and Canada, but are also found in the UK and Australia when a hung parliament emerged.
Any confusion over a CSA with a unity government – especially Mahathir's party-less unity government – suggests ignorance of comparative politics if not dishonesty.
Meanwhile, the assertion that the opposition would be co-opted under a CSA indicates both an obsession with adversarial and majoritarian politics and disconnection from the Malaysian reality.
Without some parliamentary reforms which this CSA pursues, how can the opposition function effectively in the first place?
Should a CSA include all parties?
A CSA is a voluntary deal between the government and the opposition parties. The government can choose with which opposition it wants to sign a CSA. Likewise, any opposition can choose to stay out of any CSA other opposition parties have signed up to.
Can a CSA be signed by individual MPs? Yes, if they are independents. For MPs in political parties, they should enter a CSA as a party, not individuals. CSA is not a statutory declaration by other names.
If all opposition parties do not sign CSA, should the non-CSA opposition parties be denied its benefits? For policy concessions, the government has no obligation to negotiate with the non-CSA opposition parties. In fact, the government may sign different CSAs with different parties on different policy concessions.
However, institutional reforms brought about by any CSA are public goods, not private bargains. Non-CSA opposition parties should not be excluded from parliamentary committee membership and leadership nor funding. The government must not turn a CSA into a tool of inter-party discrimination.
What should minimally be included in this CSA?
This CSA should not offer less than what has been offered by former prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin on Aug 13 and announced by Ismail Sabri on Sept 10 (see table below). These were the floor, not the ceiling. Any reduction must be fully justified. A few of these need to be highlighted.




First, equal constituency funding for all members of Parliament (MPs) should be guaranteed by a Constituency Development Fund Act to eliminate a future PM's room to use constituency allocation to extract political support from an MP.
Second, recall elections should be considered as an anti-hopping mechanism and an alternative to be considered.
Third, all Opposition MPs and Government backbenchers, including all independents, must be given the chance to take part in PSSCs. 
They must be proportionally represented on the Selection, House, and Standing Order Committees to have an equivalent say in deciding how Parliament conducts its business.
Fourth, the pre-tabling consultation and negotiation of bills and budgets must be provided through standard orders, not just an ad-hoc arrangement.
Fifth, the recognition of the Parliamentary opposition leader as a minister is a progressive step for posterity and should be adopted in the Standing Orders, Members of Parliament (Remuneration) Act 1980 [Act 437] and in the future, the cabinet manual. This must not be dropped for any individual's "face" or concern.
Should there be a duration for the CSA?
Like any contract, a CSA must have a clear time limit, and from Muhyiddin's initial offer, it looks likely to be July 31, 2022. I would prefer a longer lifespan so that this new mode of multi-partisan governance will be habituated.
All reforms should have a clear timeline by calendar date. While reforms need to be carried through parliamentary sittings, assigning a timeline on the parliamentary calendar like "the second parliamentary meeting in 2022" is extremely dangerous.

Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob
The PM, as the leader of the House, can simply push back such parliamentary meetings and dissolve the parliament before it is called, hence escaping his obligation.
The timelines must be an improvement of the status quo. For example, since the Kuching High Court has ruled that Undi18 and Automatic Voter Registration must be done by Dec 31, 2021, any deadline must be earlier. No constitutional amendment is needed.
What's there to prevent violation of the CSA?
As a political deal, the CSA's best guarantee is a colossal political cost for any violating party.
Some joint committees representing both the government and the opposition would be instrumental in monitoring, communicating, and negotiating its enforcement.
Ultimately, the public's participation in deepening the discourse and widening support for these reforms will deter the parties from reneging their promises.
Can the CSA be upgraded?
Like any contract, the CSA can be upgraded and extended. While the deal revealed this evening might not meet all our expectations, all parties involved, including the public, should push for its upgrade in the months to come.
In fact, if it works out well, its lifespan should be extended, perhaps for an additional six months for every extension.
Why do we need the CSA to be successful?
Parliament will likely be hung after GE15. This CSA gives major parties a chance to learn how to coexist with each other and compete professionally.
If it works and multi-partisanship gets internalised, we don't have to worry about more party-hopping, coalition-hopping, and frequent changes of PM after GE15.
Let's give peace a chance, even if it is not perfect. - Mkini


WONG CHIN HUAT is an Essex-trained political scientist working on political institutions and group conflicts. Mindful of humans' self-interest motivation while pursuing a better world, he is a principled opportunist.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of MMKtT.

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