Asean Gcc China A New Triangle Of Strategic Reconfiguration

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From Julia Roknifard
Ongoing geopolitical tensions centred around the rivalry between the US, Russia and China are providing the momentum for a global realignment of the balance of power especially in regional and other intergovernmental groupings.
Taking this a step further, Asean and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will be forming a three-way grouping with China, the former’s most important, and trade partner, while the Gulf states are a key energy supplier for China.
Is this new platform a sign that East and West Asia, even among the traditional US partners, is drifting away from the West or, rather, an attempt to focus regional minds on how the US is to be “handled” under Donald Trump as president without engaging him directly?
The first summit between Asean and GCC took place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 2023 and could be seen as lacking identifiable consequences.
However, considering it was held to offer a new framework for talks on a variety of matters, it can be considered a good start, as now the parties are seriously talking about meeting again as per their intention to make these summits biannual, and this time – with China.
Besides being the Asean dialogue partner since 1996 and engaging with it on a few platforms, like Asia Regional Forum (ARF) and Asean+3, China also established a more recent framework for holding discussions with the GCC.
The first China-GCC summit was held in conjunction with China’s President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022.
The kind of talks parties are looking to have are supposedly of an economic nature.
Economic considerations seem to be the main driving force for all three but there are other factors that are less obvious.
China is an important trade partner for both blocs. In 2023, China-Asean trade amounted to US$911.7 billion which places them first in each other’s list of trade partners. China’s trade with the GCC is of more modest volumes, yet impressive, standing at US$286.9 billion.
For all three, there is a looming question of how Trump, in particular his decision to impose increased tariffs on trade with China, will impact trade between the regions and what possibly could be done to mitigate the impact.
Trump also promised to impose tariffs on alternative groupings like BRICS, to which Asean and GCC states expressed significant interest.
In October 2024 Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand were granted the status of partner countries and Indonesia became a full member in January 2025, so for them, economic threats coming out of the White House are of a significant concern.
Besides Asean having a trade surplus with the US, it has been serving as a hub for China’s increasingly sophisticated diversification of supply chains and trade hubs aimed at evading US trade restrictions.
With Laos and Myanmar expressing their interest in BRICS, of which China is a founding member, the trend is clear.
As for the GCC, UAE joined BRICS as a full member in 2024, while Saudi Arabia is another potential candidate.
Again, UAE, together with four other GCC members – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait are also among dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) along with Asean’s Cambodia and Myanmar.
Among GCC states, Trump might not be seen as going directly against the grouping as it is a longstanding US ally, even though the Saudi-led block stressed that the possibility of normalisation of ties with Israel is contingent upon a sustainable solution on Gaza (instead of Trump’s proposal on “owning” and redeveloping the area).
In Asean, Trump’s reorientation back to containing China might be seen rather as a stabilising force.
During the administration of Trump’s predecessor, that focus on China had ceded its place to preoccupation with Ukraine – something concerning but far from immediate in the list of priorities for member states, with occasional attempts to lecture regional countries on where they should stand on Palestine as well.
In this context, the principle of non-interference and respect for sovereignty would be very much appreciated in both Asean and GCC.
Returning the focus on China as Trump would like could help achieve a balance in US efforts at “containing China”.
There is no contradiction of having China included into these talks, as it will allow clear ideas of where all parties stand.
The very fact that the trilateral summit is likely to take place by April, speaks of actual interest for these discussions.
The latest signal that Malaysia, as the Asean 2025 chair, has interest in promoting and strengthening new groupings and trade diversification came with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim going to great lengths to highlight his support of ties with Russia, China and intergovernmental groupings.
With over 300 key meetings that Malaysia is set to hold this year, the pragmatic, economic angle of the Asean-GCC-China Summit promises to be predominant, with Asean’s potential for development and supply of natural resources, GCC being an attractive investor and China offering one of the largest markets, as well as being a technology supplier and the heart of global manufacturing.
However, it is interesting to see how the grouping confirms the geopolitical thesis of realignment in the international system.
All three have demonstrated their appetite for political diversification not only through joining alternative organisations like BRICS or SCO but also defying the pressure coming from the West, especially the US, to restrict ties with Russia.
Instead, they continue to engage with it in various formats, both on international platforms and bilaterally.
Though Trump’s interest to sit with Russia at the table designed for only these two “big boys” of international politics, raises a question if Russia would continue to flirt with the postcolonial discourse in the Global South or will it return to the narratives of the era of bipolarity where the smaller players do not matter that much.
Thus, the Asean-GCC-China meeting will be another strategic grouping to complement Asean and other groupings to de-risk trade ties with the US and to wield more agency in managing their affairs in their own interests.
While it will likely avoid antagonising the West, especially the US, it would probably make this point softly through dialogue and assertiveness rather than open confrontation. - FMT
Julia Roknifard is a senior lecturer at the School of Law and Governance at Taylor’s University.
The views expressed here are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of  MMKtT.

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