Anwar S Second Term Needs Rafizi S Base

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Many have asked whether the resignations of Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, following the PKR party election, might affect PKR, Pakatan Harapan, and the Madani government.
Unless some global factors cause economic and social turmoil, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s power is secure till the 16th general election (GE16).
The “Rafizi question” that should be analysed in backwards deduction from the most important question in GE16 is: will Anwar get his second term?
Challenges to second-term dream
Anwar’s second term requires two conditions: first, a clear parliamentary majority with his coalition partners; second, a decent number of seats won by PKR itself.
If Umno and most other Madani partners stick together under Anwar’s leadership in GE16, Harapan and PKR would not have too many additional seats to contest than the 82 (including Muda) it won in GE15. Most of the 69 peninsula seats held by Perikatan Nasional would be contested by Umno.
PKR president Anwar IbrahimAnwar has tried hard to win greater Malay support, but ironically, his second term depends first on the ethnically mixed and Chinese-majority constituencies, then on how far Harapan and Umno can transfer votes to each other.
The fear of PAS and the “Green Wave” was instrumental in calling out minorities and liberals to vote for Harapan and, in the 2023 state election, even for its new ally Umno.
However, the non-Malay support for Madani has been steadily replaced by frustration and fatigue. In the Mahkota by-election (September 2024), Chinese turnout dropped significantly, despite DAP’s heavy campaigning.
Not that PAS/PN has managed to revert non-Muslims’ fear and distrust. Rather, minority voters feel that the difference between a Harapan-BN government and a PN one is fast disappearing.
It started with the KK Mart “Sock-gate”, where Madani took a hands-off approach to Umno Youth Chief Dr Akmal Saleh’s relentless attacks, and later, three Molotov cocktail attacks on KK Mart outlets.
The list of minorities’ discontent has grown in the past year, including the initial mishandling of the Dewi Sri Pathrakaliamman temple issue, the impunity enjoyed by radical preachers like Zamri Vinod, the “No Further Action” decision on Teoh Beng Hock’s homicide, and the changed requirement for non-bumiputera guaranteed entry to matriculation programmes.
While Anwar’s defenders may believe he is doing his best in difficult balancing acts, minorities feel their unwavering support for Harapan was taken for granted.
Can Umno save PKR?
Some sources suggest that Anwar’s support among the Malays has slowly improved. Would such improvement translate into a significant swing from PN, or a stronger vote transfer from Umno to Harapan, than in 2023? If either answer is yes, Anwar is safe.
Here are some numbers for a realistic assessment. Of the 82 seats Harapan (then including Muda) won in GE15, 32 were won with fewer than 50 percent of votes (below the red line in the graph below).
This means that Harapan benefited much from votes being split between PN and BN/Umno and would be very safe if most of Umno votes can be transferred over.
This under-50 percent statistic included 20 of the 31 seats PKR won. Among them was Anwar’s Tambun (the big red dot), which registered 79 percent turnout rate and 40 percent support.
For a conservative and simple estimate, let’s assume the partisan distribution of GE16 voters follows the GE15 pattern, and no swing between Harapan and PN.
If the Harapan-BN-PN three-cornered contests in GE15 become Harapan-BN straight fights, the outcomes would be decided by the size of these factors: (A) swing of Umno voters to Harapan, (B) swing of Umno voters to PN, and (C) reduced votes among Harapan supporters.
The question is then: would pro-Harapan Umno voters (A) exceed the combined total of pro-PN Umno voters (B) and Harapan voters who would stay home or vote for third parties like PSM-Muda (C)?
Simply put, would enough Umno voters come to PKR/Harapan’s rescue by offsetting the reduction in PKR/Harapan’s base and other Umno voters who would vote for PN? If not, perhaps Anwar should go for a full term until the last day of the 15th Parliament, on Dec 18, 2027.
Anwar’s potential ways out
Without bold institutional reforms to reduce Malay anxiety and ethnic tensions, Anwar has two potential ways to save his second-term dream.
The first is co-opting PAS and/or Bersatu into the Madani government to simply reduce the competition. Forcing Malay opposition lawmakers to a deal by financially starving them is one reason why Anwar reneges on Harapan’s election promise for equal constituency development funds (CDF).
Perikatan Nasional lawmakersIf intra-Malay competition is reduced, then Anwar can safely ignore minority discontent. (Counterintuitively, smart minority voters should support PN’s demand for equal CDF.)
The second is to reverse the political frustration and fatigue of the PKR/Harapan base. Here, “Rafizi’s base” may make a difference.
Not just in Malaysia, compromises are necessary to hold together coalition governments everywhere. But often, some parties do not get credit for the government’s achievements, but get punished by their base for sacrificing their principles.
In other words, coalition governments can land parties in an identity crisis and then electoral defeat. In Germany and the UK, small parties FDP and LibDem have been such victims.
In the Madani government, the three largest parties - DAP, PKR, and Umno - all face the same threats, even though the context is different.
Umno and DAP face questions about whether they have been silenced by power and abandoned their core constituencies. PKR and DAP’s reformist bases are not happy that many of the old corrupt practices are still in place.
Umno responded by having its Youth chief and other firebrands become a pressure group to push the government to the right, and rewarded its supporters with patronage and perks, two methods used even before 2018.
While patronage has also been trickling down the PKR and DAP hierarchy to appease supporters, this only pours fuel on the fire for the large segments of reform-minded voters in these two parties.
This explains why Rafizi’s “Jelajah Hiruk” (Revive the Idealism of Reformasi in the Test of Power) rallies during the PKR party election were so appealing to not just PKR otai (oldtimer) reformists, but even many ordinary Malaysians, including non-Malays who felt betrayed by Harapan and Gen Z Malay voters who might have voted for PN in 2022 and 2023.
Anwar’s choices on Rafizi’s camp
Naturally, Rafizi’s momentum makes Anwar uneasy and threatened. Like former Umno minister Khairy Jamaluddin, Rafizi is another politician becoming more popular after losing a power struggle in their party.
What are Anwar’s options?
Dropping Rafizi and his allies like Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad and Wong Chen (Subang MP who took a break to rethink his political future) as candidates in GE16 would be pushing the Hiruk base away to abstention, third parties and, for some, even PN.
Even if Rafizi and Nik Nazmi had accepted Anwar’s offer to stay in the cabinet and looked hypocritical after all the talks of mandate and accountability, they and PKR would lose much of the Hiruk base.
Former PKR deputy president Rafizi Ramli at a Jelajah Hiruk rallyThe only way Anwar can keep the Hiruk base for PKR/Harapan for his second term ambition is to institutionalise the craving for reforms through the government backbench.
Beyond retaining Rafizi, Nik Nazmi, Wong, and other non-mainstream PKR backbenchers as candidates in GE16 - (remember Umno’s lesson in dropping dissidents like Shahidan Kassim, Annuar Musa, and Noh Omar in GE15), they should be given more room in Parliament through the government backbench.
While ministers make compromises to sustain the coalition government, government backbenchers can champion reform. Put simply, a “good cop, bad cop” strategy.
DAP is already moving in that direction by giving backbenchers more party leadership roles and appointing its parliamentary leader from among the backbenchers.
Currently, Parliament has only 10 parliamentary special select committees (PSSCs), each with nine members, as well as the 14-member Public Accounts Committee (PAC), leaving about 60 parliamentarians (both opposition MPs and government backbenchers) without national roles like House leadership, ministerial portfolios, or committee responsibilities.
Many of the 10 PSSCs are ineffective, partly because they have few resources, partly because many are overtasked.
The most absurd? The PSSC for Infrastructure, Transportation, and Communications cover seven ministries: public works, transportation, communications, digital, regional and rural development, housing and local governments, and federal territories.
If Anwar wants to refresh his reformist credentials and make Harapan’s 58 backbenchers its brand promoters by improving policies and laws, he should simply break up the 10 PSSCs into around 20, so no PSSC covers more than two ministerial portfolios.
The chair and deputy chair of each PSSC should be given an allowance of RM 4-5,000 to cover their extra efforts.
Not just Rafizi, Nik Nazmi and Wong (overlooked ministerial material), as well as former ministers like Yeoh Bee Yin and Wee Ka Siong can also be appointed as PSSC chairs in their respective fields.
One politically realistic question: why should Anwar empower Rafizi, who may come back and challenge his daughter Nurul Izzah later?
The politically realistic answer: Anwar’s second term is the most important prize, and the PKR party election can be postponed until after GE16.
If PKR’s seats are halved, and PMX becomes XPM, how much value is the PKR presidency? On the other hand, if Harapan-BN wins big, can Nurul Izzah’s ascendancy be easily challenged?
I trust Anwar is smart enough to prioritise the battles. - Mkini
WONG CHIN HUAT is a political scientist at Sunway University and a member of Project Stability and Accountability for Malaysia (Projek Sama).
The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of MMKtT.

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