Why Temple Disputes Will Never End

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From James Chin
Hindu temple disputes, particularly those tied to squatting on contested land, are notoriously difficult to settle through political means due to a mix of historical, legal, religious, and political factors.
Many of these temples, often built by Indian labourers during the colonial era on plantation or colonial government land, lack formal ownership records.
Over time, as land changed hands — sold to private developers or reassigned by the state — temples became “squatters” in a legal sense, despite their cultural and religious significance to the Malaysian Hindu community.
Resolving these disputes is a political minefield. With Muslims as the majority group in West Malaysia, alongside a significant Chinese and Indian presence among other minorities, the issue requires a delicate balance of power.
The Indian community, making up less than 7% of the population, often feels marginalised, and temple issues amplify this sentiment.
Any move to evict a temple risks being seen as an attack on Hindu identity, sparking protests and accusations of racial animus — think of the 2007 street rallies by Hindraf (the Hindu Rights Action Force), which turned temple demolitions into a national flashpoint.
Conversely, granting legal status or new land to Hindu temples can rile up Muslim groups, especially if the land is prime real estate. Politicians, reliant on ethnic vote banks, avoid decisive action to dodge alienating either side.
This situation is made much worse by preachers who use social media to encourage the rage. They are very successful in attracting youths with emotional pleas to defend Islam.
Malaysia’s land laws don’t help. The National Land Code 1965 prioritises registered ownership under the Torrens system — undisputed possession, even for decades, grants no rights.
In a 2021 court case (Mercu Pusu Development Sdn Bhd v Setara Jaya Sdn Bhd), the court ruled that “registration is everything” under the National Land Code or Torrens system.
Temples built without permits on private or state land are technically illegal, and courts consistently uphold landowners’ rights.
Politicians can’t override this without rewriting the law, which would open a Pandora’s box of claims from all communities — Malay squatters, Chinese settlers, you name it — disrupting the status quo.
Moreover, using a new law to resolve this issue is impossible with the rise of political Islam and Malay fears that any new law will benefit the Chinese and Indian minorities.
Then, there’s the religious angle. Temples aren’t just buildings: they’re sacred spaces tied to community identity. Relocating them, even with compensation, often meets resistance from devotees who see it as sacrilege. Meanwhile, development projects like Masjid Madani carry their own religious weight.
In reality, the state lacks the political will or resources to untangle every case.
Thousands of temples dot Malaysia, more than half on disputed land. Verifying claims, compensating owners, and resettling communities would be a logistical nightmare, especially for a government juggling bigger economic and political priorities.
Take, for example, the recent non-religious case of the Kanthan farmers in Perak — decades of squatting on state land, yet no resolution, because the political cost outweighs the gain.
Finally and most importantly, the temple land issue thrives on ambiguity.
Politicians of all sides benefit from keeping it unresolved: Hindu leaders rally their base by decrying “injustice,” while Malay leaders placate theirs by “defending Islam.”
A permanent fix would kill this useful tension. My example would be the 2018 Seafield temple riots: a land dispute spiralled into violence, yet no systemic change followed.
It’s a cycle of grievance, protest, and stalemate.
In summary, these disputes are locked in a perfect storm of legal rigidity, politics revolving around racial and religious supremacy, religious passion, and political inertia.
Politicians can’t resolve them because the Malaysian political system isn’t built for consensus, it’s built to manage division.
Expect more band-aid solutions, like relocation offers, but no endgame.
Some of you will be angry with this conclusion but this is my honest take after reading a lot on the issue in the past week. Please feel free to offer your opinions. - FMT
James Chin is a professor of Asian studies and an FMT reader.
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.

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