What If Protests No Longer Bring Us Together
Yesterday, thousands gathered in downtown Kuala Lumpur for the “Turun Anwar” protest, calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.
The rally, driven by PAS Youth and endorsed by leaders of the Perikatan Nasional coalition, cited the rising cost of living and Anwar’s failure to fulfil reform promises.
Yet, beyond the spectacle of slogans and street presence, the event revealed a deeper tension in Malaysia’s protest culture: the evolving role of ideology in shaping who protests, how, and for what purpose.
In a country where protest has long carried both democratic aspirations and political risks, the rally marks a critical moment. Not because protest is new, but because its meaning is increasingly contested, shaped not only by grievance but by strategic alignments, ideological discomfort, and historical memory.
ADSNormalisation of protest and its political reversals
One of the most striking features of “Turun Anwar” is not that it happened, but who organised and legitimised it.
The rally was endorsed by former prime ministers Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Muhyiddin Yassin, political elites who, in earlier terms, either actively suppressed protest or governed through coalitions that tightened the state’s grip on dissent.
Mahathir’s first tenure was marked by Ops Lalang and the use of the Internal Security Act; Muhyiddin’s tenure saw emergency declarations that suspended Parliament and constrained public assembly. These were not accidental policies; they were designed to consolidate power and narrow civic space.

Former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad speaking at the ‘Turun Anwar’ rallyAnd yet, these same leaders have now positioned themselves as defenders of “the people’s voice”. This is not their first embrace of protest from the opposition bench. Mahathir briefly mobilised anti-Najib (Abdul Razak) sentiment in 2016, and Muhyiddin has spoken of the rakyat’s discontent since 2022.
But their use of protest today feels less principled and more expedient. That they now encourage mobilisation against a unity government they once helped undermine, while invoking democratic language, reveals a strategic repurposing of protest for partisan gain.
In this sense, “Turun Anwar” must be read not simply as an expression of discontent, but as part of a broader instrumentalisation of protest. Protest is no longer marginal in Malaysian politics; it is now a normalised, if unevenly applied, tactic in elite political competition.
Protest, ideology, and the politics of participation
Yet even as protest becomes more visible, participation is increasingly shaped by ideological lines. The “Turun Anwar” rally revealed a significant cleavage in public response.
While the organisers succeeded in mobilising a sizeable crowd, many Malaysians, particularly urban, reform-oriented, and civil society–aligned individuals, chose not to participate.

Not because they disagree with the grievances, but because they could not reconcile with the ideological underpinnings of the protest.
This points to a critical transformation. Protest in Malaysia is no longer judged solely by its cause, but also by its ideological authorship.
ADSThe discomfort stemmed from the presence and leadership of PAS and PN, the parties with ethno-religious orientations, illiberal stances on pluralism, and past records of rights restrictions. For many, to join such a protest would be to lend legitimacy to a political agenda antithetical to democratic inclusion.
This ideological framing of protest; who organises, whose voices are foregrounded, and which symbols are invoked, matters deeply. While economic grievances were the official rallying point, the protest space was heavily embedded in Malay-Muslim narratives.
The prominence of conservative religious rhetoric signalled a selective moral universe. For those who view protest as a civic act grounded in universal justice, this narrowed ideological framing is alienating.
Herein lies the paradox: protest is more accessible than ever, yet its capacity to unite across ideological divides is weakening. Protest, once seen as a unifying force of moral resistance, is now increasingly segmented, driven by partisan allegiance and identity politics.
Protest as performance or civic imagination?
The “Turun Anwar” moment also invites a broader reflection on the conceptual meaning of protest in Malaysia’s political development. In its most democratic conception, protest is a form of political authorship, a claim made by citizens over the direction of the state, grounded in a sense of collective justice.
It disrupts the formal boundaries of institutional politics and challenges dominant narratives through direct public engagement.

Yet, what happens when protest becomes performative? When it is deployed by political elites as a mechanism to erode opponents without offering alternative governance models? When its symbolic gestures are decoupled from long-term reform agendas?
This is the risk Malaysia faces. The rally’s critiques on the economy, subsidies, and governance are not insignificant. But when the moral authority of protest is wielded by those who once curtailed its space, the symbolic terrain of dissent becomes murky. Protest risks becoming hollowed out, reduced to populist venting rather than civic vision.
To be clear, this does not mean protest must be pure or non-partisan. But the erosion of protest’s ethical coherence, its connection to structural critique, inclusive representation, and principled action, undermines its long-term democratic value.
Towards a more honest protest politics
“Turun Anwar” is not just a symptom of policy dissatisfaction; it is a reflection of Malaysia’s evolving but fragile protest culture. It highlights both the opportunities and contradictions of a more open civic space.
While it demonstrates that protest is no longer automatically repressed, it also reveals how protest can be co-opted, reframed, and ideologically enclosed.

The protest also signals how far the reformist narrative has fragmented. The disappointment in the Anwar government is real and widespread, not only among opposition voters, but also among those who once fought for institutional reform and rights-based governance.
That they chose not to march is not a sign of apathy; it is a sign of principled hesitation.
Malaysia must reclaim protest not merely as a tool of opposition, but as a civic practice animated by values. This includes the right to dissent from both the state and from movements that exploit dissent for power without principle.
The future of protest in Malaysia will not be determined solely by numbers in the street, but by whether we can reimagine it as a space of political ethics, not just political expediency. - Mkini
KHOO YING HOOI is associate professor at Universiti Malaya.
The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of MMKtT.
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