Critical Moments In Chinese Malay Relations After World War Ii

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From Wong Tai Chee and Lim Teck Ghee
Seventy years ago a paper entitled “Aspects of the Racial Problem in Malaya” was published in 1949 by a scholar Ian Morrison in the journal “Pacific Affairs”. This paper analysed the political situation in Malaya after World War II and the position taken by the British colonial power which impacted on Chinese-Malay relations.
Morrison’s paper provided an objective overview and analysis of the development of race relations immediately after World War II that is still relevant in some ways today.
Morrison’s article begins with a quote from British economics professor T H Silcock’s letter to the London Times which read: “It is not the problem of dealing with a few thousand Communist terrorists. It is not the problem of maintaining the flow of dollars from Malayan rubber and tin.
“These are trivial and ephemeral matters compared with the real problem. (The real problem is) there are representatives of three races, Chinese, Malay and Indian, (and) these races are so inextricably tangled in one economic network that no serious person can consider wholly removing any one element.
“It is futile to waste much time in arguing who immigrated when and why, and who is responsible. The practical problem is how these races are going to live together without turning their country into an ulcer.”
In 1948, the Malayan “State of Emergency” had begun, and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had retreated to the jungle to engage in guerrilla warfare.
Morrison was of the view that the Malayan Communist Party established by the Soviet Third International in the early 1930s, would have great difficulty in succeeding.
What the MCP could rely on for their cause was to draw on the lessons of peasant exploitation by landlords in China, Vietnam and North Korea.
However, this socio-economic reality was basically non-existent in Malaya, where almost all Malay rice farmers were self-cultivators.
There were no big landlords to fight against or to redistribute their lands to the landless for support.
The British strategy, which was an early precursor of the international division of labour with a metropolitan industrial core versus a satellite agricultural periphery, was not to set up any industry in Malaya.
As a colony, Malaya had few industrial workers as it only supplied rubber, tin and other raw materials to the industrial core countries. In the tin mines and rubber estates, workers were mainly immigrants and their children.
Although they were poor in Malaya, they enjoyed better living conditions than their places of origin. They were generally not motivated to overthrow British rule, and more importantly, they lacked the will to build a nation of their own in Malaya.
Based on the above factors, it is not difficult to understand why an opportunistic British colonial power decided to mobilise a large force of troops to fight the MCP forces.
Chinese new villages
The British assumption was that they would be victorious, and it was worthwhile doing it given the value of Malaya to the British exchequer. The alternative was to walk away from Malaya and lose control and economic benefits as they did in India and Myanmar.
During the “State of Emergency”, the British, Australian and Fijian troops implemented a “Home Guard” programme in the Malay villages, and resettled rural Chinese residents into about 500 Chinese new villages with tight security.
After their supply lines were blocked, the MCP guerrillas lost their fish and water links with the population, which led to their ultimate defeat.
After World War II, the British modified their “Divide and Rule” tactic to one aimed at fostering peaceful coexistence on race relations. This was to protect their interests while preparing a peaceful transfer of power planned for Malaya.
According to Morrison, the British Colonial Office in London during the war years had already drafted a programme to prepare for the forthcoming autonomy of Malaya.
Based on the 1931 population census, the Colonial Office found that if the three Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, Malacca), the four Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Pahang, Negeri Sembilan) and the five Non-Federated Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Terengganu, Kelantan, Johor) were merged into one political entity, the Chinese population would account for 39.1% of the new nation’s population or more than the 37.2% of the Malays.
Such a situation was seen as a great disadvantage to the economically vulnerable Malays when the transfer of power took place to an elected government.
It was also recognised that any new political alignment – especially one that included Singapore – had to have the consent of the sultans.
In 1946, the British issued a white paper on the Malayan Union that excluded Singapore. But it was still opposed by the rulers because the proposal sought to grant citizenship to the Chinese and Indian population.
Together with the newly-established United Malays National Organisation (Umno), which was established to protect Malay rights and interests, they formed a coalition to put pressure on the colonial government.
Special position of Malays
Over the two subsequent years, the British initial emphasis on promoting racial harmony disappeared in a working committee and the multiple bargaining sessions conducted with the representatives of Umno and the Malay rulers.
The end product was the 1948 Constitution of the Federation of Malaya which specified the special position of Malays.
This provision has since become the single most important influence on race and religious relations in Malaysia.
The voices of civil opposition against the 1948 Constitution were basically weak.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce, together with other groups, did write to the British Colonial Office to express their “total disappointment” with the Constitution.
They felt that it would bring about uncompromisable opposition between races, mistrust and disharmony to society, and they called for a new royal commission to rewrite the constitution.
But this call failed to resonate with the key decision-making members of the working committee which had representatives from Umno and the rulers but none from the Chinese and Indian communities.
For the Chinese community, the political future appeared even worse since the MCP and its armed insurrection against colonial rule was regarded as one drawing on Chinese leadership and was part of a Chinese dominated political movement.
At the same time, the British colonial government’s push for a local military build-up had met with Umno’s support.
Malay leaders saw this as a great opportunity to develop an ethnic-based armed force for an independent Malaya.
The expansion of the Malay Regiment during that period provided the nucleus for the federal army that was subsequently built and monopolised by Malay leadership as well as rank and file.
Unlike the strong growth in Malay nationalist consciousness in the community’s elite and educated groups, Chinese associations continued to remain basically inactive and generally assumed a non-politicised stance and a non-localised orientation to political developments.
Morrison’s article also points out that the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), set up in 1949, came into being at the urging of the British high commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, who was surrounded by Chinese businessmen that were not interested in local politics.
It is not surprising that these MCA leaders whose main focus was largely their own business interests were not able to fight for the rights and interests of the Chinese community. - FMT
Wong Tai-Chee and Lim Teck Ghee are FMT readers.
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.

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